Israel is reportedly preparing for the possibility of an Iranian attack coinciding with its upcoming elections, according to reports from Israel. The Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF) discussed this heightened alert, with founder Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi detailing potential threats and strategic considerations.

Potential Threats and Iranian Motivations

General Avivi indicated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Shin Bet, and Mossad are operating at a high state of readiness. Intelligence suggests that adversaries aim to interfere with the elections, specifically to prevent Prime Minister Netanyahu's government from continuing. This motivation stems from a perceived threat to the Iranian regime and its regional influence, often referred to as the "Shia axis," due to Netanyahu's proactive strategy.

Several scenarios are being considered:

• Direct Attack from Iran: Iran may seek revenge for past actions, potentially launching a preemptive strike. The IDF and the U.S. are closely monitoring Iranian movements.
• Proxy Attacks: Hezbollah in Lebanon is reportedly rearming, and Hamas is attempting to rebuild its capabilities, both posing potential threats.
• Palestinian Authority (PA) Involvement: Prime Minister Netanyahu has addressed the threat of attacks originating from the PA. The PA reportedly has 60,000 armed personnel, ostensibly for internal security, but these forces could be used against Israel. The Israeli government recently approved plans to counter such a scenario, which, if enacted, could lead to the dismantling of the PA and the destruction of its capabilities. However, a significant concern is the potential for spontaneous attacks without prior intelligence, making proactive defense challenging.

Beyond these direct threats, the possibility of broader terror attacks targeting Jewish communities globally, Israeli tourists, or embassies remains a concern, as evidenced by past incidents like the Fly Dubai attack.

The Palestinian Authority and Escalation Scenarios

The distinction between current operations against terrorist cells and a full-scale conflict with the PA is critical. Israel currently acts on intelligence regarding individuals planning terror attacks, regardless of their affiliation (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PLO, Fatah), often coordinating with the PA for policing within areas they control.

However, if the PA's forces were to engage in an act of war by attacking Israeli civilians or the military, the response would be a full-scale war. This would involve taking over PA-controlled cities entirely and dismantling the authority. Such an operation would be extensive, utilizing air power, drones, tanks, APCs, and bulldozers, leading to a significantly altered reality. The PA's forces are described as larger and better trained than Hamas, necessitating a comprehensive military response rather than targeted operations.

The pressure to execute a significant attack within Israel is growing as the dismantling of the Shia axis progresses. This could emanate from the PA or from within Israeli Arab cities and towns, where hundreds of thousands of illegal weapons are reportedly concealed. The next Israeli government will need to prioritize internal security alongside border defense.

Potential for Internal Unrest and Israeli Arab Involvement

The possibility of an escalation involving Israeli Arab citizens is also a consideration. While Hamas anticipated an uprising of Israeli Arabs during the October 7th attacks, this did not materialize. However, if the PA were to initiate an attack, a spontaneous rise of Israeli Arabs cannot be ruled out, though it is not a guaranteed outcome. Conversely, a deterioration of the internal security situation within Israel could occur independently of PA actions, similar to the riots during Operation Guardian of the Walls.

The worst-case scenario involves a coordinated attack from the PA, coupled with significant riots from Palestinian society and potentially parts of Israeli Arab society. While many Israeli Arabs are loyal citizens, the sheer size of the population means that even a fraction engaging in problematic behavior could create a severe crisis.

Intelligence Failures and the October 7th Attack

The discussion also addressed claims that the government possessed prior intelligence regarding the October 7th attack. General Avivi argued that while the political climate and internal divisions in Israel in the year preceding the attack may have weakened deterrence, specific, actionable intelligence was absent.

A military intelligence "warning" requires precise details: who, what, when, where, and how. General Avivi stated that no such warning existed. He criticized those who claim to have issued general warnings without taking concrete preparatory actions, such as reinforcing borders or increasing readiness.

He highlighted a critical procedural failure: the standard procedure of waking all personnel along the border before dawn was not followed. Furthermore, tank crews were not deployed to fighting positions, reportedly to save costs. This inaction, despite receiving significant intelligence on the night of October 7th, is seen as a failure of the army and Shin Bet to operate in a wartime mode.

General Avivi asserted that claims of prior warnings are not accurate and that military leaders who believed war was imminent would have taken vastly different actions. He contrasted this with the government's responsibility, which includes long-term strategic decisions like enhancing munitions production and maintaining army strength.

The focus on past events, particularly the alleged intelligence failures, is seen as a political tactic rather than a constructive approach to future security challenges. The emphasis, General Avivi concluded, should be on future plans for winning the war, normalization, and economic enhancement.