In 1972, philosopher Peter Singer published a paper titled "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," presenting a revolutionary argument that challenges the conventional moral outlook of individuals in affluent societies. Singer contends that the prevailing moral stance, including that of friends and relatives, is profoundly mistaken, necessitating a complete reevaluation of personal lives and societal structures. The paper's radical nature lies in its ability to assert this sweeping conclusion without specific knowledge of an individual's life, values, or daily practices, relying instead on broad assumptions about the audience's societal context.

The Distinction Between the Supererogatory and the Obligatory

To understand Singer's argument, a crucial distinction must be made between the "supererogatory" and the "obligatory." An action is considered obligatory if one has a moral duty to perform it; failure to do so results in moral wrongdoing. Conversely, an action is supererogatory if it is good and commendable but not morally required. These actions go beyond the call of duty, representing extra efforts that are not binding.

For example, bringing coffee and danishes to an early morning meeting for colleagues is a supererogatory act if no one was assigned this task. It is a kind gesture, but not a requirement. However, if one had committed or promised to bring coffee and breakfast, then performing this action becomes obligatory. Similarly, donating a dollar to a charity at a supermarket checkout is supererogatory. While a good deed, it is not a moral requirement.

Singer's Core Thesis

Singer's central claim targets organizations like Oxfam and UNICEF, which channel funds from affluent populations to aid those suffering from famine and other crises. He argues that while society generally views charitable giving as supererogatory—a nice but optional act—this perspective is fundamentally flawed. Singer posits that for affluent individuals, donating to famine relief is not merely a good deed but a moral obligation, akin to the imperative not to murder or to save a drowning child.

He asserts that the common practice of spending money on non-essential luxuries, such as new clothes or cars, instead of donating to famine relief, cannot be morally justified. The only justifiable moral stance, according to Singer, is one that recognizes the obligation to prioritize famine relief over such luxuries.

The implication of Singer's thesis is stark: if one fails to donate to famine relief while possessing the means, they have committed a moral wrong. Every purchase of non-essential clothing, every upgrade to a vehicle when the old one is functional, and even the convenience of buying a pre-made cup of coffee, are viewed as morally questionable actions if the funds could be used to prevent suffering.

The Argument for Obligatory Charity

Singer's argument, as extracted from his paper, can be structured into the following premises and conclusion:

1. Premise 1: If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, then we must morally do it.
2. Premise 2: Hunger, disease, and other sources of suffering, disability, and death are very bad.
3. Premise 3: The luxuries on which we spend money are not of moral significance.
4. Premise 4: By donating money to relief agencies like Oxfam, we can prevent hunger, disease, and other sources of suffering, disability, and death.
5. Conclusion: Therefore, we must morally donate the money we would spend on luxuries to relief agencies, and we are obligated not to spend it on those luxuries.

Premise 1 is the most controversial, presenting a broad claim about moral duties. Premise 2, stating that suffering and death are bad, is widely accepted. Premise 3 identifies luxuries—such as new clothes when old ones are adequate, or new cars when old ones function—as lacking moral significance. Premise 4 is an empirical claim, asserting that organizations like Oxfam effectively use donations to prevent suffering.

The Shallow Pond Analogy

To support Premise 1, Singer employs the famous "shallow pond" analogy. He asks readers to imagine walking past a shallow pond and seeing a child drowning. The moral imperative is to wade in and save the child, even if it means getting one's clothes muddy. The cost—muddy clothes—is considered insignificant compared to the very bad outcome of the child's death. Singer argues that if one were to refuse to save the child due to the minor inconvenience of soiled clothing, they would be considered morally monstrous.

Singer suggests that this intuition can be generalized. The moral significance lies not in the specifics of the situation (a child, water, muddy clothes) but in the core elements: a preventable, very bad outcome and a morally insignificant sacrifice. He contends that the same principle applies to famine relief.

Addressing Potential Objections

Singer anticipates and addresses several objections to his argument:

• Proximity: One objection is that in the pond scenario, the victim is nearby, whereas famine victims are geographically distant. Singer counters that modern communication makes proximity irrelevant to knowledge of suffering. Furthermore, the existence of efficient relief organizations negates the practical relevance of distance for effective aid.
• Presence of Others: Another objection is that in the famine relief scenario, many others could also donate, unlike the pond situation where one might be the sole witness. Singer argues that the presence of others is only relevant if they actually act. If others fail to help, the obligation remains on the individual. The fact that many people donate to charities, but not enough to solve the problem, means that individual contributions are still necessary and morally required.
• Demandingness: A common objection is that Singer's conclusion is too demanding, requiring individuals to give up all luxuries. Singer acknowledges this as a standard utilitarian objection but argues that morality can indeed be demanding, and disliking a conclusion does not make it false. He considers a weaker principle where only some luxuries need to be foregone, but ultimately leans towards the stronger principle, suggesting significant sacrifice is required.
• Government Responsibility: Some argue that private donations might lead governments to reduce their aid. Singer dismisses this, stating that not enough people will donate to significantly impact government policy, and that the primary goal should be to save lives, regardless of potential systemic shifts.
• Postponing Famines: A final objection suggests that donating to famine relief merely postpones inevitable future famines. Singer argues that this is irrelevant; saving lives in the present is a moral imperative, and the potential for future suffering does not negate the duty to act now. He likens this to refusing to save a drowning child because they might drown in another pond later, an argument he deems callously absurd.

The Radical Conclusion

Singer's argument leads to the radical conclusion that most affluent individuals, including the reader, are acting immorally on a daily basis by purchasing non-essential goods. The paper suggests that the moral failing of not donating to famine relief is comparable to the moral failing of letting a child drown. While many find this conclusion difficult to accept, Singer maintains that the argument's logic is sound, and it is hard to identify a flaw in its reasoning. The paper challenges individuals to confront the possibility that their everyday actions, perceived as morally neutral or even positive, may in fact be ethically deficient.