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Максим Кац

Руслан Левиев: Удары по энергетике | Новые ракеты ВСУ | Потери авиации (English subtitles)

Oct 3, 2026

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Ruslan Leviev: Strikes on Energy Infrastructure | New Ukrainian Missiles | Aviation Losses

War update: Tracking battlefield advances is hard! See analysis of Ukraine's new FP-7 missile, drone tactics, energy strikes & aviation losses.

This autumn's analysis of the war's pace differs from previous periods. Ukrainian monitoring project DeepState has ceased publishing figures on the Russian army's advance, marking the second consecutive month without such data. The Finnish Black Bird Group's usual mid-month reports are pending. The pro-Russian outlet Creamy Caprice, which presents the most optimistic view for the Kremlin, shows a roughly 20% decrease in the Russian army's pace of advance in September, even with its lenient methodology of counting any sign of Russian troops as territorial control. The difficulty in producing objective estimates has increased due to both sides periodically presenting old footage as new to support claims of territorial gains.

The AFU 3rd Army Corps reported successes in Operation Vivaldi, aimed at clearing the Shandryholove salient, releasing footage of fighting and flag displays in various settlements. Analysis of the vegetation in this footage indicates it is old summer material, likely from July or August. This aligns with Ukrainian advances reported around July near the villages of Ridkodub and Katerynivka, and the settlement of Nove, which the AFU 3rd Army Corps has now announced as liberated. Control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka was also claimed, though these areas have been under Ukrainian control for some time.

In response, the Russian Ministry of Defense released footage of troops in Ridkodub, with vegetation matching the current season but the footage itself being a year old, confirmed by geolocation and comparison of burned fields with satellite imagery. Russian claims of troops in Novomykhailivka were geolocated to a different area entirely. Footage from Yampil was also released by Russia without any preceding Ukrainian claims. Under these conditions, with conflicting and aged visual evidence, calculating the pace of advance is deemed highly difficult, and specific figures will not be produced.

The Shandryholove salient has been eliminated, creating a gray zone between Novoliubivka and Kolodiazi where Ukrainian forces are gradually establishing control. While some believe the AFU has crossed the Zherebets River, no signs of advances east of it have been observed, beyond a strike near Terny that appeared to be Russian forces targeting a Ukrainian position. The challenges of advancing beyond the Zherebets River, with the river itself becoming a logistical obstacle, are significant. The AFU 93rd Mechanized Brigade has demonstrated the use of amphibious ground drones for supplying units, capable of operating on both land and water. A Ukrainian advance east of the Zherebets River is possible if Russian defenses are weak, but a southward movement along the river towards Yampil or northward towards Makiivka and the Borova sector is considered more likely.

An unusual Ukrainian attack occurred near Vilkhuvatka in the Kharkiv Region, an area where Russian propagandists claim a pocket of 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers is encircled. This encirclement is deemed impossible due to the thinly spread troop positions along the front line. The attack involved two Ukrainian tanks equipped with anti-drone meshes, engaging Russian positions with direct fire. These tanks were supported by Ukrainian FPV drones, a heavy Vampire bomber drone ("Baba Yaga"), and a Mavic drone for navigation, compensating for the limited visibility within the tanks. The use of armored vehicles and drones in this manner reflects an adaptation of tactics to current combat conditions.

Further evidence supports the point that public statements about capturing settlements do not prevent Russian forces from striking them if necessary. The Russian MoD announced the capture of Mala Korchakivka in March and Korchakivka in April, yet on September 28, it published reports of Russian artillery striking Ukrainian positions in Mala Korchakivka, suggesting strikes on its own claimed territory.

In September, despite a general slowdown in Russian advances, a local success was achieved in the Dobropillya sector, with Russian forces establishing positions beyond the line of fortifications near Shevchenko. Assault infantry is accumulating near Dobropillya, with infiltration into the city from Novyi Donbas. Overall, September saw local tactical successes for both sides, with Ukrainian gains being more pronounced. However, neither side's advances have created a critical situation for the other. A further slowdown in pace is expected in October as foliage diminishes, making concealment from drones more difficult.

Ukraine's Ballistic Missile

On October 1, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the first combat use of Ukraine's FP-7 ballistic missile. This should not be confused with the future FP-7.x anti-aircraft missile for the Freya air defense system. Zelenskyy provided no details regarding the missile's deployment or target. Reported ranges for the FP-7 vary from 200 km to 300 km, sufficient to cover occupied territories but not Moscow. As of October 2, no confirmed impact or damage consistent with a ballistic missile strike has been reported.

The introduction of new weapons is often met with the question of whether they are "game-changers." While FPV drones have significantly impacted armored vehicle tactics, they have not fundamentally altered the war. Similarly, the FP-7 ballistic missiles are not expected to be a "game-changer" on their own. Their impact will depend on production volume rather than technical specifications. For instance, Russia's extensive production of Shahed drones poses a significant problem, whereas limited production would have minimal impact. The same principle applies to Ukrainian ballistic missiles and Flamingo missiles, which, despite being relatively easy for Russian air defenses to intercept, gain significance with increased production and scale of use. The landing site of the launched FP-7 and the production numbers expected by year-end are key factors to monitor, as is the eventual deployment of Ukraine's longer-range FP-9 ballistic missile, capable of reaching Moscow.

The Jet-Powered Geran

As cold weather approaches, Russia is intensifying strikes on energy infrastructure, employing new tactics by targeting the metal pylons of power transmission lines with drones. Estimates suggest a jet-powered Geran costs over 100,000,significantlymorethanaconventionalpiston−engineGeran(Shahed)ataround100,000, significantly more than a conventional piston-engine Geran (Shahed) at around 30,000. The cost of power pylons ranges from 15,000to15,000 to 25,000 per unit, excluding repair and installation costs.

In August, Ukrainian intelligence warned of Russia's development of new metal-cutting munitions for attacking electricity pylons. Recent attacks on pylons have caused outages in the Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv regions. Russia has also begun targeting bridges in Kyiv with drones, attempting to damage stay cables with similar munitions, aiming to disrupt civilian life and the economy.

Zelenskyy stated that Putin has lifted previous restrictions on strikes against Ukraine. This follows intensified aerial bombardments on Sumy, a city far from the front line, with aerial bombs used almost daily. These strikes, including those on Mala Korchakivka (nearly 20 km away), serve no military purpose and constitute war crimes.

Monitoring of aerial strikes on both sides of the front line continues, with efforts to geolocate, cross-check, and verify each incident. In September, Kyiv and the surrounding region recorded the highest civilian casualties among Ukrainian-controlled territories, with 53 killed and 421 injured, notably a high number of wounded. The Donetsk Region reported 58 deaths and 286 injuries. The capital region is expected to remain a priority target for Russian aerial strikes.

Aviation

Fighter aircraft and their ammunition are crucial for intercepting jet-powered Gerans. Belgium, which had promised F-16 deliveries to Ukraine in 2025 on October 11, 2023, has delivered none to date. Zelenskyy announced that Belgium will guarantee the delivery of three F-16s by the end of the year, with an additional four to be provided as spare parts.

Fighter aircraft losses continue. On October 1, a Ukrainian MiG-29 was shot down while conducting missile and bomb strikes, resulting in the pilot's death after ejection. The cause of the shootdown is not definitively known but is presumed to be an air defense missile system.

Russian aviation has also sustained losses, often self-inflicted. On October 1, a Russian Mi-8 helicopter was shot down by a Russian Su-35 fighter in the Voronezh Region. The fighter crew mistakenly identified the Mi-8, which was flying during a Ukrainian drone attack, as a Ukrainian drone. All three crew members of the Mi-8 were killed. The size difference between the Mi-8 and typical Ukrainian drones did not prevent the mistaken engagement. This highlights the risks associated with the "Carpet" airspace closure protocol during drone attacks, which aims to prevent friendly fire incidents.

Ukraine's planned operation to paralyze Russian air traffic by launching 1,000 drones daily has not yet materialized significantly.

Challenges in Assessing Battlefield Advances

Tracking the pace of the war has become difficult as monitoring projects stop publishing data and both sides use old footage to claim territorial gains. This section highlights the manipulation of videos and satellite imagery by both Ukraine (Operation Vivaldi) and Russia, making objective assessment challenging. The analysis suggests Ukrainian advances in the Shandryholove salient were more successful than officially acknowledged, while Russian claims are often based on outdated or misrepresented evidence.

  • Ukrainian monitoring project DeepState has stopped publishing data on Russian army advances.
  • The Finnish Black Bird Group's data is delayed, leaving only the pro-Russian Creamy Caprice.
  • Creamy Caprice's figures show a 20% fall in the Russian army's pace of advance in September.
  • Both sides are using old videos as new ones to support claims of territorial gains.
  • Ukrainian AFU 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi used old summer footage (July/August) to claim liberation of settlements like Ridkodub and Katerynivka.
  • Russia's MoD released footage of troops in Ridkodub, which was a year old, and misidentified footage in Novomykhailivka.
  • The Shandryholove salient has been eliminated, creating a gray zone between Novoliubivka and Kolodiazi.
  • There is no evidence of AFU crossing the Zherebets River and pushing deep into Russian positions.
  • Amphibious ground drones are being used by the AFU 93rd Mechanized Brigade for supply.

Tactical Innovations and Contradictory Claims

The report details a unique Ukrainian tank attack near Vilkhuvatka, Kharkiv Region, featuring tanks with anti-drone meshes and extensive air support, including FPV drones, a Vampire bomber drone ('Baba Yaga'), and a Mavic drone for navigation. It also notes that armored vehicles remain relevant in drone warfare, emphasizing the adaptation of tactics rather than a 'return' of tanks. The section also points out that Russian MoD statements about capturing villages are contradicted by subsequent reports of Russian artillery striking those same villages.

  • Ukrainian forces launched an unusual attack near Vilkhuvatka using two tanks with extensive anti-drone meshes.
  • The tanks were supported by FPV drones, a Vampire bomber drone ('Baba Yaga'), and a Mavic drone for navigation.
  • Visibility from inside tanks with anti-drone mesh is limited, necessitating aerial navigation assistance.
  • Armored vehicles remain relevant and necessary in drone warfare, representing an adaptation of tactics.
  • Russian MoD announced capture of Mala Korchakivka (March) and Korchakivka (April), but later showed artillery striking Mala Korchakivka (September 28).
  • Russia achieved a local success in the Dobropillya sector in September, establishing positions beyond fortifications near Shevchenko.

Ukraine's FP-7 Ballistic Missile

Ukraine announced the combat use of its FP-7 ballistic missile on October 1st. While details are scarce, the missile's range is estimated between 200-300 km, capable of striking occupied territories but not Moscow. The report questions whether new weapons are 'game-changers,' suggesting their impact depends on production scale, citing FPV drones and the FP-7 as examples. It also notes the potential for Ukraine's longer-range FP-9 missile.

  • Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the first combat use of Ukraine's FP-7 ballistic missile on October 1st.
  • The FP-7 missile's range is estimated between 200 km and 300 km.
  • The missile can cover occupied territories but not Moscow.
  • There is no confirmation yet of a successful FP-7 strike or typical ballistic missile damage.
  • New weapons are not necessarily 'game-changers'; their impact depends on production scale.
  • FPV drones have significantly changed armored vehicle tactics but not the war as a whole.
  • Ukraine's longer-range FP-9 ballistic missile, capable of reaching Moscow, is anticipated.

Russian Strikes on Energy Infrastructure and Civilian Areas

Russia is intensifying strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure as cold weather approaches, targeting power transmission line pylons with drones. The cost-effectiveness of using expensive jet-powered Geran drones against relatively cheaper pylons is questioned. Attacks on power pylons have caused outages in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv regions. Russia is also targeting bridges in Kyiv with similar munitions. Civilian casualties in Kyiv and the surrounding region were highest in September, indicating it remains a priority target.

  • Russia is increasing strikes on energy infrastructure, targeting metal pylons of power transmission lines.
  • Jet-powered Geran drones, costing over $100,000 each, are being used.
  • Power pylons cost an estimated 15,000–15,000–25,000 each.
  • Attacks on pylons caused outages in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv regions.
  • Russia is also attacking bridges in Kyiv, targeting steel stay cables.
  • Strikes on Sumy, far from the front line, are considered war crimes.
  • Kyiv and the Kyiv Region had the highest civilian casualties in September (53 killed, 421 injured) among Ukrainian-controlled territories.

Aviation Losses and F-16 Deliveries

Belgium has guaranteed the delivery of three F-16s to Ukraine by the end of the year, with four more to be used for spare parts, despite an earlier promise of delivery in 2025. A Ukrainian MiG-29 was lost on October 1st, with the pilot killed. Russian aviation also suffered losses, including a Mi-8 helicopter shot down by a Russian Su-35 fighter in a friendly fire incident during a Ukrainian drone attack. The 'Carpet' protocol is explained as a measure against friendly fire incidents during drone attacks.

  • Belgium promised F-16 deliveries to Ukraine starting in 2025, but has delivered zero so far.
  • Belgium now guarantees delivery of three F-16s by the end of the year, plus four for spare parts.
  • A Ukrainian MiG-29 was lost on October 1st during missile and bomb strikes; the pilot died.
  • A Russian Mi-8 helicopter was shot down by a Russian Su-35 fighter in the Voronezh Region due to mistaken identity during a drone attack.
  • The 'Carpet' airspace closure protocol is activated during drone attacks to prevent friendly fire incidents.
  • Ukraine reportedly planned an operation to paralyze Russian air traffic with 1,000 drones daily, but little has been heard since.