In June 1941, German forces broke through Soviet defenses within a matter of days and encircled the main forces of the Western Front. In September, the Wehrmacht destroyed a large Soviet group near Kyiv, and in October it repeated the success at Vyazma and Bryansk. The Soviet Union lost millions of servicemen, thousands of tanks and aircraft, as well as important industrial and agricultural regions.

However, it was in late autumn 1941 that the German offensive lost its momentum. The strategy of a rapid defeat of the USSR collapsed before Moscow.

The author of the study identifies ten factors that led to the halt of the Wehrmacht. These factors do not form a ranking, since their significance changed at different stages of the campaign. They were interconnected and reinforced one another. Taken together, these factors determined the outcome of the Battle of Moscow.

1. Personnel Losses

By the start of the offensive on Moscow, the German High Command had encountered a problem it had hoped to avoid as early as the summer. Wehrmacht losses turned out to be significantly higher than expected, while the number of trained soldiers available for replacements was becoming ever smaller.

• From 22 June to 31 August 1941, Germany's ground forces on the Eastern Front lost approximately 409,998 men killed, wounded, and missing in action.
• Over the same period, only 217,000 replacements arrived from Germany.
• By the beginning of September, the personnel shortfall had reached 193,000 men.

The author notes that these figures are approximate.

By 26 November, the irrecoverable and medical losses of Germany's ground forces on the Eastern Front amounted to 743,000 men. Of these, 156,000 had been killed, 557,000 wounded, and 30,000 gone missing. This total constituted about 23% of the average strength of the German ground forces operating against the USSR.

By the end of November, the German High Command estimated the personnel shortfall on the Eastern Front at roughly 340,000 men. The reserve training system within Germany had only 33,000 trained soldiers ready to be sent to the front-line army.

The consequences were felt most acutely in the infantry. According to German assessments, in some units the combat strength of companies had been reduced by about half. On average, an infantry company retained only 50–60 men fit for direct combat, which amounted to half the required strength.

The German High Command considered disbanding certain units to use their personnel to reinforce other formations. Hitler quickly rejected this initiative.

From the beginning of November to 3 December, Army Group Center lost another 45,000 men. These losses occurred during the final attempt to break through to the capital.

2. Exhaustion of the Wehrmacht's Strategic Reserves

At the moment of the attack on the USSR, the Reserve of the High Command of the German Army had 24 divisions. By the end of August, 21 of them had already been sent to the front: 10 to Army Group South, eight to Army Group Center, and three to Army Group North. Of the original reserve, three divisions remained at the disposal of the German command.

Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht retained the capacity to attack. For Operation Typhoon, which began on 2 October, the Germans concentrated about 75 divisions with a total strength of nearly 2 million men. In early October they encircled large Soviet groupings near Vyazma and Bryansk.

After these victories, the manpower problem continued to worsen. New offensive operations required fresh troops, yet the Wehrmacht had almost no ability to quickly replace its losses.

3. Concentration of Soviet Forces in the Moscow Direction

By early October 1941, the Soviet high command had concentrated significant forces in the Moscow direction. The Western, Reserve, and Bryansk Fronts numbered about 1,250,000 men, 990 tanks, and 7,600 guns and mortars. Fifteen armies operated in this sector.

This grouping could not immediately halt the German offensive. On 2 October, the main forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive. Within a few days, the main forces of several Soviet armies were encircled near Vyazma and Bryansk. The Germans captured large numbers of prisoners, artillery, and equipment. The defensive front west of Moscow essentially had to be built anew.

By 12–13 October, about 90,000 servicemen were stationed on the Mozhaysk line, which extended to Kaluga. These forces covered the most dangerous approaches to the capital. For comparison, at the end of September there were more than one million Soviet soldiers along the entire Moscow strategic axis. The author notes that these figures refer to fronts of different lengths, but they show the scale of the catastrophe after the Vyazma defeat.

On 10 October, the Stavka placed the Western and Reserve Fronts under Zhukov's command. Instead of two independent headquarters in the main sector, a single defense command was created. At the same time, units began urgently concentrating on the Mozhaysk line.

A continuous line of defense was lacking, so Zhukov concentrated the main forces in four key sectors:

• The Volokolamsk direction was covered by Rokossovsky's 16th Army;
• The Mozhaysk direction by the 5th Army;
• The Maloyaroslavets direction by the 43rd Army;
• The southern approaches to the capital by the 49th Army.

Large gaps remained between the sectors. It was along these directions that German motorized units could most quickly reach Moscow.

On 17 October, the Stavka created the Kalinin Front under Konev. Its task was to cover the northern direction and counter the German offensive in the Kalinin area.

The priority of the Moscow direction is also evident in the distribution of Soviet weapons. The American historian Rotundo calculated that by early October, about 30% of all rifle and cavalry divisions operating on the Eastern Front were assigned to the Moscow direction. In addition, 54% of artillery regiments and about 35% of tank brigades were concentrated there.

After the October defeats, this concentration only increased. By 1 November, the Western strategic direction held 34% of all Soviet rifle divisions, 52% of tank brigades, and 55% of artillery regiments operating on the Soviet-German front.

By the start of the new German offensive in November, 20 anti-tank artillery regiments were operating simultaneously on the Western Front. Never before had such a concentration of specialized anti-tank artillery existed on a single front.

The number of divisions did not reflect their actual combat effectiveness. Many units had suffered heavy losses, and some had been formed recently. However, the Soviet high command was able to reinforce the most dangerous sectors with artillery, tank brigades, and infantry, instead of spreading all forces evenly across the enormous front.

Therefore, after the destruction of the Soviet armies near Vyazma, the Germans did not gain free routes to Moscow. The Stavka concentrated a substantial part of its troops and equipment on the defense of the capital and restored the defense in the directions of the main German strikes.

4. Transport Infrastructure

One of the Red Army's most important advantages in the Battle of Moscow was the capital's transport infrastructure. Eleven railway lines converged on Moscow, connecting the city with the country's industrial regions and various sections of the front. The Moscow Circular Railway, 54 kilometres long, made it possible to redistribute traffic among individual routes.

Thanks to this system, the Soviet command could relatively quickly transfer troops, artillery, and ammunition from one sector of the Moscow front to another.

This advantage was especially significant in November 1941. The German command attempted to encircle Moscow from the north and south simultaneously. In the north, armoured units advanced through Klin and Solnechnogorsk. In the south, Guderian's forces tried to bypass Tula and reach Kashira. The Soviet command had to constantly move units to wherever the situation was most critical.

The scale of transport operations is reflected in military transport records:

• in October and November 1941, 1,125 centralised operational railway transports were carried out for the Western Front;
• these required 64,500 railway wagons;
• every day, between 50 and 55 military trains were unloaded at Western Front stations.

Railway workers simultaneously ensured the delivery of troops, the supply of active armies, and the evacuation of industrial enterprises to the east.

As an example, the author cites the transports of 24–25 November. The Western Front transferred the 7th Guards Rifle Division from the 49th Army, which was defending the Serpukhov sector, to the disposal of Rokossovsky's 16th Army. The transfer required 25 railway trains, which covered the distance from the southern sector of the front to the northern one in two days, where enemy armoured units were continuing their advance on Moscow.

On 20 November, Zhukov ordered an armoured unit to be urgently transferred from Serpukhov to Zvenigorod. The railway services organised the transport under special supervision. Despite the overloading of the main lines, the train arrived at its destination 3 hours and 25 minutes ahead of schedule.

The Moscow railway junction operated under extremely difficult conditions. The Germans had cut several western routes, while the roads linking Moscow with the eastern regions of the country were overloaded with oncoming traffic. Military trains, weapons, and ammunition were moving west, while evacuated enterprises, equipment, and people were moving east.

In October, about 7,000 wagons accumulated on the Moscow Circular Railway. In November and December, this figure was approximately 6,000.

To manage transport operations, a special Military Transport Directorate for the Moscow railway junction was established on 24 October. Eleven military operational departments were combined under a single command.

Railway workers introduced temporary one-way traffic, sent trains one after another, lengthened station tracks, and organised urgent unloading of military trains. A transport system that had been functioning peacefully had to be rebuilt directly in the course of the fighting.

The fuel supply is revealing in this respect. The Western Front had mobilisation reserves in the warehouses of Moscow and the Moscow Region, as well as fuel from reserves evacuated from the western regions of the USSR. According to research by the Soviet military rear services, by early December the Western Front troops had stocks of motor and other fuel equal to five to six refuellings. About 70% of the fuel had been delivered directly to the troops and to army depots.

However, the transport advantage did not guarantee uninterrupted supply. The shortage of ammunition remained acute. In the defensive battles, stocks at army field supply bases did not exceed three-quarters of the established norm, while at front-line depots they amounted to one norm. The command limited shell expenditure and distributed ammunition according to the importance of combat tasks.

The developed transport network allowed the Soviet command to address one of the main tasks of the defensive battle: rapidly reinforcing threatened sectors. When the Germans broke through in one direction, part of the forces could be moved there from another.

The railways also provided logistics, delivering reinforcements, weapons, fuel, and ammunition. The proximity of Moscow's warehouses and repair enterprises shortened the distance to the active units.

All of this significantly helped the Red Army hold the front during the most difficult weeks of November 1941.

5. Aviation: Losses, Technical Condition, and Relocation

On October 2, 1941, the advance of Army Group Center was supported by a powerful air force grouping. For Operation Typhoon, the Germans allocated 1,387 aircraft. The main role was played by Luftflotte 2 under Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. Its formations were to destroy Soviet troops at the front, attack lines of communication, and support the advance of the armored groups.

Over the four months of war on the Eastern Front, the German air force suffered significant losses. From June 22 to November 1, with an average strength of 2,462 aircraft, an average of 741 machines per month were destroyed or damaged. Of these, 240 were single-engine fighters, 268 were twin-engine bombers, and 60 were dive bombers. The statistics also include repairable aircraft, so some of them returned to service.

The example of Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps from August 10 to 21, 1941, is indicative. During 12 days of fighting on the northern sector, the corps completely lost 10% of its aircraft. Another 54% of the machines suffered damage of varying severity. Personnel losses (killed, wounded, and missing in action) amounted to 12.5%. Subsequently, it was this corps that was to play an important role in supporting the last German offensive on Moscow.

The condition of the air force was complicated by maintenance problems. As the front advanced eastward, air units constantly relocated to new airfields. Most forward landing strips were ordinary unpaved fields. Fuel, ammunition, and spare engines with tools had to be transported across roadless terrain. Repair units did not always keep pace with the combat units.

During one of his inspections of the Eastern Front, Field Marshal Milch discovered hundreds of unserviceable aircraft at forward airfields. Their repair was delayed due to a shortage of spare parts.

In October, the situation was worsened by the rasputitsa (the seasonal thaw and mud). Waterlogged unpaved airfields restricted takeoffs and landings, and low cloud cover hindered the search for targets. Before the onset of bad weather, the German air force could carry out more than 1,000 sorties per day. On October 8 their number fell to approximately 559, and on October 9 to 269.

The situation was worst for the bomber force. According to German statistics, in October 1941 the share of serviceable Luftwaffe bombers was approximately 38%. The remaining machines were temporarily out of combat operations or were under repair. Across the entire German air force, serviceability was about 54%.

Meanwhile, the Soviet air force was strengthening the defense of the capital. After the catastrophic losses of summer 1941, new fighter units were sent here. The number of Soviet fighters in the Moscow sector grew from 285 to 674 machines by December 5. Soviet aircraft could use the network of airfields in Moscow and the Moscow Oblast, which had a more developed repair infrastructure and prepared runways.

German pilots continued to operate from forward airfields, where difficulties with supply and maintenance arose.

In November, the German command made a decision that weakened the air support of Army Group Center. On November 15, Luftflotte 2 was ordered to relocate to Italy. Its headquarters and part of its subordinate air units, including the II Air Corps, moved to the Mediterranean.

As a result, the main burden of direct support for German troops near Moscow fell on Richthofen's corps, which by that time was already exhausted.

German air raids did not cease. On clear days, the air force continued to carry out intensive strikes. From November 15 to 24, the VIII Air Corps carried out about 1,300 sorties.

However, the Germans were no longer able to provide large-scale support simultaneously across all sectors of the vast Moscow front. With the onset of severe frosts, new technical difficulties were added. Frozen, uneven airfields damaged the landing gear and tail wheels of aircraft. Servicing the engines of Bf 109 fighters in field conditions was especially difficult. Without spare parts, even minor malfunctions kept an aircraft out of service for long periods.

By the end of November, the German air force retained the ability to deliver powerful strikes against individual sectors of the front. However, it had lost the capacity to provide the constant and massed support to ground forces that it had furnished in the summer of 1941. At the same time, an increasingly numerous Soviet fighter aviation, supported by the capital's air defense system, was operating in the Moscow area.

For German armored and infantry units, this meant the loss of one of the most important advantages they had enjoyed since the first days of the invasion of the USSR.

6. Mobilization Reserves of the USSR

The German high command assumed that after five months of fighting the Soviet Union had exhausted its manpower. However, by December the Soviet command had reserves that the Germans had not expected.

On October 1, 1941, the Stavka strategic reserve contained only four rifle and three cavalry divisions. A month later, despite catastrophic defeats at Vyazma and Bryansk, the reserve already numbered three armies, including 22 rifle and eight cavalry divisions. By early December, eight more reserve armies were positioned behind the active fronts.

Mobilization, launched immediately after the German attack, played an important role. By July 1, approximately 5.3 million additional people had been called up in the USSR. However, the mobilized men still had to be assigned to units, trained, armed, and provided with commanders. Therefore, turning a large number of conscripts into a combat-capable army took several months.

From June 22 to December 1, 291 divisions and 94 separate brigades entered active service. Of these, 97 divisions had existed before the war, while the remaining 194 were hastily formed after the German attack began.

During this period, 150 divisions and 44 brigades arrived in the Moscow strategic direction. These figures reflect the cumulative flow of units. They do not mean that all formations were under Moscow at the same time. Some of these forces had already suffered heavy losses before the autumn battles.

Units stationed in the eastern USSR were a separate source of reinforcements. They were transferred from Transbaikalia, Primorye, and other Far Eastern regions, where the Red Army maintained significant forces in case of war with Japan. However, not all units that arrived near Moscow were from the Far East.

New divisions were also formed in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Volga region, the Urals, and the central regions of the country.

One of the first large Far Eastern units to arrive in the Moscow direction in October was the 32nd Rifle Division of Colonel Viktor Polosukhin. It had recently been stationed in Primorye, and on October 9–10 its trains were already unloading at Mozhaisk. The division was assigned the defense of the Borodino Field, where fighting with advancing German units began on October 12. Soviet soldiers were opposed by the Wehrmacht's 10th Panzer Division and the SS motorized division "Reich." The division had to hold a wide section of the front. Some units were still on the way when the Germans began their attacks.

In late October, another Far Eastern division appeared near Moscow. This was the 78th Rifle Division under Colonel Afanasy Beloborodov. Its main units had been deployed in Primorsky Krai. Transporting it required 36 railway trains, the last of which departed from the Vladivostok area on October 17. By October 28, units of the division were already unloading in the Istra area.

The division numbered about 14,000 men. It was armed with 23 light tanks, 53 guns, 22 howitzers, and 59 mortars. In early November, its 258th Rifle Regiment went into battle at the junction of the 16th and 5th Armies. For several days the regiment repulsed German attacks. On November 26, the 78th Rifle Division was renamed the 9th Guards Division for its distinction in combat.

One of the most famous units fighting near Moscow in winter was the 316th Rifle Division of Ivan Panfilov. It was not transferred from the Soviet-Japanese border. The division began forming on July 12 in Alma-Ata from residents of the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSRs. In August it was sent to the Northwestern Front, where it spent some time in army reserve. Only on October 7–10 did the division advance into the Volokolamsk direction. By mid-October it was fighting intensively as part of Rokossovsky's 16th Army.

The most intensive flow of reserves continued in November. In the first 15 days of the month, about 100,000 men, 300 tanks, and 2,000 guns were sent to the western direction. The reinforcements were used both to restore worn-out units and to form new ones.

At the same time, the Stavka was forming new armies in the depths of the country. In October, four new reserve armies were created, and in November, eight more. They were not hastily committed to battle in full, although the situation on the approaches to Moscow remained extremely difficult.

On November 20, the formation of the 1st Shock Army began. By December 1, it numbered about 36,950 men, concentrated in the Dmitrov and Yakhroma area. The army suffered from a serious shortage of weapons. For every 37,000 men there were 25,000 rifles, 103 guns, and 335 mortars. Vehicles, horses, and command personnel were also lacking. Already on December 2, units of the army received orders to attack German forces that had broken through to the Moscow–Volga Canal.

Another large grouping was being formed south of Moscow. In Penza Oblast, the 10th Army of General Filipp Golikov was taking shape. By early December it included seven rifle and two cavalry divisions with a total strength of about 100,000 men. From November 24, the army began moving to the Ryazan area. It was to act against the southern flank of the German grouping that was bypassing Tula.

North of the capital, in the Lobnya and Khimki area, the new 20th Army was concentrating. Its formation had also begun under the directive of November 20. By December 1, the army included the 331st and 352nd Rifle Divisions, two tank brigades, and several rifle brigades.

Together with the 1st Shock Army, these forces were to act against the German grouping advancing from the direction of Klin and Solnechnogorsk.

The German command did not have complete information about the scale of the Soviet reserve build-up. By the end of November, the new armies were already behind the front line, and the German staff knew of the existence of many of them only partially.

When Soviet troops went over to the counteroffensive on December 5–6, the Germans encountered units that only a few weeks earlier had been in the deep rear or had just completed their formation.

The training of the reinforcements varied considerably. Among those arriving were regular Far Eastern divisions with years of service and training experience. There were also entirely new units formed within a few weeks. On the whole, many units lacked artillery, transport, and trained commanders. Nevertheless, even taking these shortcomings into account, the USSR's mobilization system ensured the constant replenishment of the active army with personnel and the creation of new formations.

As a result, during the two months of the Battle of Moscow, the Red Army was able to restore its battered units, receive reinforcements, and form new armies for the counteroffensive. The main role in this was played by the mobilization capabilities of the Soviet Union, not merely the transfer of Siberian or Far Eastern divisions.

7. German Command Decisions and Contradictions in Planning

In the summer of 1941, a serious conflict arose between Hitler and the Army High Command (OKH) over the further course of the war. Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder and Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, insisted on continuing the advance on Moscow. Hitler, however, demanded above all the destruction of Soviet forces on the flanks and the seizure of economically important regions of the USSR.

This dispute lasted almost two months and directly affected the timing of Operation Typhoon. On July 30, Hitler signed Directive No. 34, which ordered Army Group Center to temporarily go over to the defensive. The reasons cited were the emergence of new Soviet formations, supply problems, and the need to restore the armored groups. Repairing equipment and replenishing stocks required about 10 days for the armored groups.

On August 18, the main effort of the German air force was simultaneously shifted from the central to the northern sector. On the same day, the Army High Command presented a new plan. It envisaged the start of the offensive on Moscow in the first days of September. Army Group Center was to receive 42 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and 12.5 tank and motorized divisions. The command planned to deliver two pincer strikes against Soviet forces concentrated west of the capital.

On August 21, Hitler definitively rejected the General Staff's proposal. He declared the main objectives before winter to be the Crimea, the Donbas industrial region, the severing of Caucasian oil supplies to the USSR, and the blockade of Leningrad. Moscow was pushed into the background.

To defeat the Soviet Southwestern Front, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Army under Maximilian von Weichs were sent to Ukraine. The operation ended in a significant success for the Wehrmacht. In September, the main part of the Southwestern Front was encircled near Kiev. According to German data, 665,000 Soviet servicemen were taken prisoner.

For Army Group Center, this success meant the loss of several weeks, during which its mobile units took part in battles far to the south of the Moscow direction.

On September 6, Hitler signed Directive No. 35, which provided for a new offensive on Moscow. The 2nd Panzer Group was to return from Ukraine, and Hoth's 4th Panzer Group was to be transferred from near Leningrad. From the north, the 1st, 6th, 19th, and 20th Panzer Divisions were also arriving in the Moscow direction, and from the south, the 11th.

The command had to organize the transfer of large mechanized formations over hundreds of kilometers along the front.

Operation Typhoon began on September 30 with the offensive of Guderian's panzer group. The main forces of Army Group Center went on the offensive on October 2. Thus, more than five weeks passed between the August decision to turn toward Ukraine and the start of the new strike. To claim that this turn deprived Germany of a guaranteed victory would be incorrect.

Near Kiev, the Wehrmacht did indeed encircle a large Soviet grouping which, under other circumstances, would have continued to threaten the southern flank of Army Group Center. However, by August the German armored units already needed repair and replenishment. Therefore, the question of whether they could have successfully advanced on Moscow a month earlier remains debatable.

After the encirclement of Soviet forces near Vyazma and Bryansk, Hitler and the General Staff again concluded that the Red Army was on the verge of final defeat. On October 3, Hitler publicly declared that the enemy was broken and would be unable to recover.

On October 12, the German command received instructions regarding the future of Moscow. Hitler ordered the city to be surrounded, its capitulation not to be accepted, and German troops not to enter the city. It was planned to destroy the capital by artillery bombardment and air raids, while preventing civilians from leaving through German positions.

On October 16, the operations department of the General Staff sent the army groups a new assessment of the situation. According to the data received, the Soviet command was allegedly preparing to withdraw the remaining units into the interior of the country and form new divisions from them in winter. German troops were ordered to pursue the retreating units and prevent their organized withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the Stavka continued to build up defenses on the approaches to Moscow and was preparing new armies.

By early November, the German command faced the question: continue the offensive or go over to winter defense. The condition of German troops was well known to the General Staff. According to the assessment of the Army High Command, the combat effectiveness of an infantry division had dropped on average by 35%, and that of tank divisions by 40–50%.

In total, 136 German divisions were operating on the Eastern Front at that time. Their combined combat strength was assessed as the equivalent of only 83 fully manned divisions.

Most telling is the fact that the German General Staff clearly understood the difficult situation of its troops. Nevertheless, not only Hitler but all the generals insisted on continuing the advance on Moscow.

Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder advocated continuing the offensive, despite the known condition of the army. On November 13, in Orsha, he held a conference attended by the chiefs of staff of three army groups and representatives of seven armies. The participants discussed the possibility of one last major offensive before winter set in.

Representatives of the command of Army Groups North and South spoke out against continuing active operations. They pointed to the weakness of the troops, the shortage of supplies, and the impossibility of achieving serious results. Army Group Center also understood the risk; however, von Bock supported one more attempt at an offensive.

Halder believed that the Red Army had suffered such heavy losses that one final blow might bring success.

On November 15, German troops again went on the offensive. In the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups tried to bypass Moscow through Klin and Solnechnogorsk. In the south, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army was to bypass Tula and reach Kolomna. Its right flank was constantly being extended, which required the allocation of additional units to cover the lines of communication.

Even at the end of November, German intelligence continued to underestimate Soviet capabilities. An assessment by the "Foreign Armies East" department dated November 22 claimed that the transfer of Soviet units from less dangerous sectors to Moscow probably indicated the exhaustion of the Western Front's reserves. The only exception was the Far Eastern units, which had already arrived.

In reality, new Soviet armies continued to concentrate behind the front line.

In the first days of December, the German offensive came to a definitive halt. The decision to continue the advance on Moscow, taken in November, compelled the Germans to expend all their available reserves on the eve of the Soviet counteroffensive.

Therefore, responsibility for the strategic miscalculations of autumn 1941 cannot be placed on Hitler alone. He did indeed change the direction of the main thrust in August. However, the leadership of the General Staff and the command of Army Group Center actively pushed for the continuation of the offensive in November.

The German command overestimated the capabilities of its forces and underestimated the ability of the Red Army to make good its losses.

8. Resistance of Soviet Troops

The German command systematically underestimated the resistance of the Red Army. This was not only a matter of the heroism of individual soldiers, officers, and units who stubbornly defended Moscow. It must also be taken into account that the Soviet command had changed its strategy of conducting the war. This is clearly seen in the example of Operation Typhoon.

On 7 October 1941, German tank corps closed the encirclement ring near Vyazma. The main forces of the 19th, 20th, 24th, and 32nd Soviet armies were cut off. At the same time, units of the 3rd, 13th, and 50th armies were encircled near Bryansk. For the Germans, this was a major success.

However, the encircled Soviet troops did not lay down their arms. They attempted to break out and continued to tie down significant enemy forces. Near Vyazma, organized resistance continued until 12–13 October. Combat in the area of the pocket tied down about 28 German divisions. Not all of these divisions took part in the blockade of the encircled armies at the same time. The significance of this resistance is also confirmed by German documents.

Near Vyazma, the 40th and 46th Motorized Corps of Erich Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group were forced to hold the encirclement ring instead of continuing the advance on Moscow. Only on 14 October were the main forces engaged in liquidating the pocket able to regroup for further movement. As a result, the pursuit of the retreating Soviet units was delayed.

The resistance of the encircled armies not only gained time for the creation of a new line of defense, but also caused heavy fighting for the German tank units.

A similar situation developed near Bryansk. The encircled Soviet armies were ordered to break out to the east while maintaining command and combat effectiveness to the greatest extent possible. For example, Yakov Kreizer's 3rd Army was to break through nearly 300 kilometers of wooded terrain and through German barriers. By 8 October its units had covered about 60 kilometers and entered into heavy combat with the enemy. From 8 to 11 October, Soviet units attempted to break through German positions at the Desna River. This forced the Germans to hold blocking lines and repel attacks in their own rear, instead of using all their forces to advance on Tula and Moscow.

The actions of Soviet tank units deserve separate consideration. On 3 October, the Germans occupied Oryol and effectively broke through to the city before the Soviet command could organize its defense. On 4 October, Mikhail Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade blocked the path of the German 4th Panzer Division. At the time of its formation, the brigade had received 55 tanks, including seven heavy KV tanks and 22 T-34s.

Using ambushes, short counterattacks, and coordination with infantry, Katukov's tankers fought heavy battles on the approaches to Mtsensk from 4 to 11 October. Later, Guderian acknowledged that his 4th Panzer Division had suffered significant losses and that the advance on Tula had to be postponed. The Soviet command claimed that it had destroyed 133 German tanks, but German documents do not confirm such a total number of losses.

In any case, the delay of the advance was real. It gave Soviet troops additional time to organize the defense of Tula.

Heavy fighting also took place on the Mozhaisk line. From 12 to 17 October, Colonel Viktor Polosukhin, with the 32nd Rifle Division, defended the Borodino Field, covering the road to Moscow. The division defended a sector about 40 kilometers long, holding its positions against German tank and motorized units.

To the south, in the Maloyaroslavets direction, about 3,500 cadets of the Podolsk military schools and other Soviet units fought. The film «Podolsk Cadets» is dedicated precisely to this battle. The cadets held the Ilyinsky defensive sector even after the Germans had broken through in neighboring sectors.

As a result, the capture of Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on 18 October did not lead to an immediate advance of the Wehrmacht to the Soviet capital. German units had to break through new defensive lines one after another.

At the same time, the Soviet command did not limit itself to passive defense. The Red Army regularly carried out counterattacks on the flanks of German units. This disrupted their combat formations and forced them to allocate forces to protect their lines of communication. For example, on 10 October the SS Motorized Division "Reich" was subjected to a counterattack by Soviet tanks on its flank and lost about 500 men.

In November, resistance continued directly on the near approaches to Moscow. On 16 November, German troops attacked the positions of Ivan Panfilov's 316th Rifle Division in the Volokolamsk direction. According to the combat report of the division's headquarters, by noon the enemy had captured several settlements, but Soviet units continued to hold the positions covering the approaches to the Volokolamsk Highway.

The defense of Tula deserves particular attention. In late October, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army attempted to take the city in order to bypass Moscow from the south. By that time, units of the Soviet 50th Army had been badly damaged in previous battles. According to a report by Colonel Leonid Sandalov dated 30 October, the combat units of some rifle divisions had only 200–500 fighters remaining. The city's defenders had at their disposal about 69 artillery pieces, including anti-aircraft guns.

Nevertheless, the remnants of the army's units, the 156th NKVD Regiment, the Tula Workers' Regiment, and the 732nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment managed to repel the first German attacks. On the evening of 30 October, the defense was reinforced by the 32nd Tank Brigade, which had 34 tanks. As a result, Guderian failed to take Tula despite repeated attempts. By the end of November, Soviet troops had already begun to move over to active operations.

Even in sectors where German tank units continued their attempts to advance, on 27–28 November, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps of Pavel Belov and other units carried out counterattacks in the area of Kashira, where the forward detachments of the 2nd Panzer Army had broken through to the town. The German advance in this direction was halted, after which the enemy began to withdraw.

All of this took place before the general Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow began on 5 December.

These facts allow us to draw a certain conclusion. German troops did achieve a major victory near Vyazma and Bryansk, destroying a significant part of the Soviet armies defending the Moscow direction. However, even after such a success, they could not move on the capital unhindered.

The resistance of the encircled Soviet units delayed the release of German forces. Tank counterattacks disrupted offensive plans, and the defense of Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, and Tula forced the Wehrmacht to engage in heavy fighting again and again. German units were constantly tied down in battle.

The German command expected that the destruction of each subsequent Soviet grouping would open the way to ultimate victory. However, each time it turned out that the Red Army continued to fight, and further advance required a new operation. It was precisely this continuous resistance that became one of the main reasons for the failure of the strategy of a rapid defeat of the USSR.

9. Loss of Offensive Mobility by the Wehrmacht

Why did German forces advance hundreds of kilometers a day in the summer of 1941, yet in November struggle forward only a few kilometers over several days? What happened to the German war machine over the five months of fighting?

The answer to this question explains the main cause of the collapse of the German blitzkrieg. The author believes this factor connects nearly all of the circumstances considered.

By autumn 1941, the Wehrmacht had gradually lost its principal advantage: the ability to conduct rapid offensive operations involving deep breakthroughs, encirclements, and the envelopment of large enemy groupings. The German army could still deliver powerful blows, capture cities, and destroy individual Soviet units. However, its capacity to repeat such operations one after another was rapidly declining.

This became evident already during the advance on Moscow. On June 22, 1941, German panzer groups broke through Soviet defenses, and by June 28 their forward units linked up near Minsk. In six days the Wehrmacht advanced hundreds of kilometers and encircled the main forces of the Western Front.

The success of such operations rested on the high speed of panzer and motorized units, close coordination with aviation, and the ability to continuously supply advancing troops and quickly move reserves to where they were needed. However, with every kilometer covered, the distance to German supply bases increased, and every new battle brought losses that the German command could not keep up with replacing.

The scale of equipment attrition is shown by data on Guderian's own panzer units. According to the records of Franz Halder, by September 19 only 20% of the tanks in the 3rd Panzer Division remained serviceable. In the 17th Division the figure was 21%, in the 4th 29%, and in the 18th 31%. A considerable share of the remaining vehicles was either under repair or irretrievably lost.

Before the start of Operation Typhoon, the Germans managed to restore many damaged tanks and receive new machines through the transfer of additional divisions. As a result, by October 2 Army Group Center had roughly 1,000 tanks. However, even this impressive grouping went into the offensive after three months of the most grueling fighting.

The problem was not limited to tanks. On September 20, the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Group reported the loss of about 30–40% of its wheeled transport. In early October, Erich Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group reported that only half of its available vehicles remained in service. The motorized units were gradually losing their mobility.

Serviceable tanks could still make rapid dashes, but the trucks following them with ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and food fell behind. Without these vehicles, even a panzer corps that had successfully broken through could not long continue the advance.

The transport crisis became especially acute after the first successes of Operation Typhoon. On October 11, only 39 serviceable tanks remained in the 20th Panzer Division. On October 14, the headquarters of the 4th Army reported that the movement of motorized equipment across terrain off the roads had become practically impossible. In some cases, the SS motorized division "Reich" had to continue the advance on foot, since its vehicles could not move along the broken roads.

For a unit that was supposed to break rapidly into the depth of Soviet defenses, this effectively meant the loss of its main advantage.

By this time the autumn rasputitsa had set in, aggravating the existing problems. After the rains of October 9–11, unpaved roads turned into boggy traps. Trucks got stuck, required towing, broke down, and consumed enormous quantities of fuel. The absence of hard-surfaced roads forced traffic to concentrate on a few main routes, where congestion developed.

By the end of October, the forward units of the 2nd Panzer Army and the 4th Panzer Group were strung out over approximately 40–50 kilometers. A massive traffic jam had formed. Instead of a concentrated blow with all forces, German commanders increasingly could commit only those units that managed to reach the front line.

Rail supply was also hampered. German rear services were forced to convert the Soviet railway network to the European gauge, restore destroyed bridges, and organize new supply stations. Meanwhile, the front continued to move farther from the main transshipment points.

According to published German transport data, normal supply of Army Group Center in November 1941 required about 32 railway trains daily. In fact, about 16 arrived, that is, half.

In addition, goods delivered by rail then had to be carried by truck to divisions that kept moving farther from the unloading stations. A vicious circle thus emerged. To continue the advance, more and more fuel, ammunition, and spare parts were needed, while their delivery was becoming ever more difficult.

Equipment wore out, tanks required repair, and German units increasingly had to halt while waiting for supplies or for lagging infantry. Each such delay gave the Soviet command time to organize its defenses, after which the Wehrmacht was again forced into heavy fighting.

By the end of October the condition of the German panzer divisions had again deteriorated markedly. For example, as of October 31, the 1st Panzer Division had 36 serviceable tanks, the 6th had 66, and the 10th had 87. These units were to take part in the decisive offensive on the Soviet capital. They were intended not merely to cover the flanks.

The number of serviceable vehicles kept changing: repair services returned some damaged tanks to service, but new battles and breakdowns again reduced their number.

On November 15, Army Group Center resumed its large-scale offensive. The German command hoped to bypass Moscow from the north and south.

A comparison with the summer operations shows how much the Wehrmacht's capabilities had changed. If in June the panzer groups covered hundreds of kilometers in a matter of days, then in November Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group advanced only about 60 kilometers over two weeks of fighting. The average pace was about 4 kilometers per day.

The 3rd Panzer Group progressed somewhat better, but it too could no longer carry out the deep breakthroughs characteristic of the first months of the war. Instead of wide encirclements of Soviet armies, German units increasingly attacked the forces defending directly in front of them. Meanwhile, irrecoverable losses continued to grow. From the beginning of November to December 3 alone, Army Group Center lost another 45,000 men.

The reduction of combat infantry posed a particular danger. Even panzer divisions that had retained a significant share of their equipment could not continue the offensive without motorized infantry, engineers, and artillery. Infantry units, which were forced to cover overextended flanks and hold vast stretches of front, no longer had their former capacity to support the offensive.

By early December the situation of the army group had become critical. Its northern panzer groups approached Moscow but had practically exhausted their offensive capacity. Farther south, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army failed to take Tula or break through to the capital from the south. In addition, the army group command had no large fresh reserves to replace the exhausted units.

Moreover, along a front about 800 kilometers long, the German armies had to not only continue the offensive but also repel Soviet counterattacks threatening their overextended flanks.

The German forces halted before Moscow not because everything suddenly went wrong. Five months of campaigning had consumed a considerable part of the resources that had secured the initial victories. Each new success demanded more time and cost more.

The loss of offensive momentum became the main sign of the collapse of the blitzkrieg. The German command had built its strategy on the rapid destruction of Soviet armies and counted on the Red Army being unable to recover from the first catastrophic defeats. However, the war dragged on.

While German units were gradually losing their combat effectiveness, the Soviet Union continued to form new armies, transfer troops, and restore its defenses.

By the end of November, the German war machine remained extremely dangerous, but it no longer possessed the decisive superiority necessary for a swift conclusion of the campaign.

10. Severe Winter and the Wehrmacht's Lack of Preparedness

The harsh winter is the most common explanation for the Wehrmacht's defeat near Moscow. However, the author argues that the German offensive began to lose momentum even before the real frosts set in. At the same time, the influence of winter cannot be denied. Several figures show how poorly the German army was prepared to continue the war.

The German high command initially expected to complete the main combat operations before winter arrived. After victory, it was planned to withdraw about two-thirds of the divisions from the Soviet Union and leave the rest as occupation forces. Winter supply arrangements were organized precisely on the basis of these calculations.

However, the war dragged on, and by November the front faced an acute shortage of warm clothing.

On 10 November, Chief of the General Staff Halder learned that, due to transport difficulties, the delivery of winter uniforms to the front would be delayed. The delay was expected to last until the end of January 1942 or longer. On 30 November, Field Marshal von Bock complained that his soldiers still had not received winter greatcoats, while the temperature was falling rapidly.

According to Soviet meteorological service data, the minimum temperature in Moscow Oblast was −8 °C in October 1941, −17 °C in November, and dropped to −28 °C in December. German commanders reported even stronger frosts, but their figures differ from Soviet meteorological observations.

Even a frost of around −20 °C posed a serious danger to soldiers who spent their days in the open in standard greatcoats and leather boots. The Germans tried to keep warm with straw, made improvised footwear, and obtained or seized valenki (felt boots) and padded jackets from the local population.

The frost also created problems with weaponry. In severe cold, lubricants thickened. The mechanisms of rifles, machine guns, and artillery pieces froze. Halder noted a case near Tikhvin where, at a temperature of −35 °C, only one of five German tanks could fire. The situation with vehicles was no better. Starting frozen engines sometimes required up to two hours of preliminary warming. Attempts to start the vehicles by towing led to engine and transmission breakdowns, so equipment had to be kept with engines running for hours. All of this further increased the consumption of scarce fuel.

The consequences proved especially severe during the Soviet winter counteroffensive. In the winter of 1941–1942, the German army lost 250,000 men to frostbite.

The example of the 6th Panzer Division is revealing. In early January 1942, it held positions in open terrain. Around 800 cases of frostbite were registered there daily. On 3 January, combat engineers used about 5 tons of explosives to create shelters in the frozen ground. After this, the number of new frostbite cases declined.

However, these circumstances do not mean that the Red Army found it easy to fight in winter. Soviet troops also suffered from the frost, especially during offensives, when soldiers spent their days without shelter. But the Red Army had an advantage in winter clothing and in experience operating equipment at low temperatures. Therefore, the frost did not become the main cause of the Blitzkrieg's failure.

The lack of preparation by the German command significantly worsened the position of an army already exhausted by five months of continuous fighting.

By November 1941, the crisis of the German offensive was evident along the entire Eastern Front. This directly affected the situation of Army Group Center. The German high command could not simply pull dozens of additional divisions from other sectors and redeploy them to Moscow, because neighboring army groups were themselves in an extremely difficult situation.

11. The Crisis on the Neighboring Sectors of the Front

In the north, the Wehrmacht failed to take Leningrad. On September 8, German troops captured Schlisselburg and established a land blockade of the city, but further advance stalled. In October, Army Group North launched a new operation, hoping to link up with Finnish forces on the Svir River and completely isolate Leningrad.

On November 8, the Germans captured Tikhvin, cutting the city's most important railway supply line.

However, Soviet counterattacks soon followed. German units were forced to go over to the defense. On December 9, they abandoned Tikhvin. The Red Army subsequently pushed the enemy back 100–120 kilometers.

Thus, instead of successfully completing the campaign, Army Group North was forced to hold an overextended front and repel the Soviet offensive.

In the south, the situation was no better. After major victories in Ukraine, Army Group South continued its advance toward the Donbas and Rostov-on-Don. On November 21, Ewald von Kleist's panzer army captured Rostov, the key gateway to the North Caucasus.

As early as November 17, the Soviet Southern Front had launched a counteroffensive, striking the flanks of the German grouping. On November 29, the Red Army liberated the city, and Kleist's forces began a retreat to the Mius River.

The defeats proved so serious that they caused a conflict between Hitler and the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who insisted on the necessity of a withdrawal. On December 1, the field marshal was relieved of his command.

The main point is that Army Group Center received priority in preparing Operation Typhoon. As already noted, this was partly achieved by transferring mobile units from other sectors.

However, the German high command could not concentrate all available Wehrmacht forces around Moscow. Leningrad continued to resist. In the north, fierce fighting continued over Tikhvin, while in the south the Red Army launched a counteroffensive near Rostov. Further weakening of these sectors created the threat of new Soviet breakthroughs.

The defeats near Rostov and Tikhvin cannot be considered the direct cause of the decisions made in November near Moscow. They became fully apparent only after the start of the final German offensive on the capital. Nevertheless, the scale of the crisis is evident. German troops required additional forces everywhere, yet the German high command had no free reserves capable of ensuring a decisive victory near Moscow.

Conclusion

One of the main factors behind the failure of the German blitzkrieg was the stubborn resistance of the Red Army, which the German command systematically underestimated.

This was not only a matter of the heroism of individual soldiers, officers, and units. The Soviet command also changed its strategy of conducting the war. This is especially evident in the example of Operation "Typhoon."

The author's conclusion: by autumn 1941, the Wehrmacht had lost its main advantage, the ability to carry out rapid offensive operations with deep breakthroughs and encirclements. German units could still deliver powerful blows, but the possibility of repeating such operations one after another was rapidly declining. It is this loss of offensive mobility that links nearly all of the circumstances listed: the losses, the wear on equipment, the overstretched supply lines, the winter, the crisis on other sectors of the front, and the resistance of Soviet troops.

The German army halted outside Moscow not because of a sudden breakdown. Five months of campaigning had exhausted a significant share of the resources that had secured the initial victories. The Soviet Union withstood the first blow, continued to resist, and forced the enemy into a protracted war for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared.

When Soviet troops launched their counteroffensive in early December, they encountered a different German army: weakened, stretched across a vast expanse, and practically incapable of conducting new large-scale offensive operations. Therefore, the Battle of Moscow was not an accidental failure of the German army, but the natural outcome of the summer-autumn campaign of 1941.

On December 8, 1941, Hitler signed Directive No. 39 calling for a complete halt to the offensive and a transition to defense along the entire Eastern Front. The document cited the early onset of a harsh winter and supply problems. However, as shown above, the causes ran much deeper.

The Wehrmacht failed to accomplish the task with which, five months earlier, it had invaded the Soviet Union: to destroy the Red Army and end the war in a single short campaign.